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We study option management by committee. Analysis is illustrated by tenure
decisions. Our innovations are two-fold: we treat the committee's problem as
one of social choice, not of information aggregation; and we endogenise the
outside option: rejecting a candidate at either the probationary or tenure
stage return the committee to a candidate pool. For committees with N
members, we ¯nd three key results: (1) a candidate's fate depends only on
the behaviour of two `weather-vane' committee members - generalised me-
dian voters; (2) enthusiastic assessments by one of these weather-vanes may
harm a candidate's chances by increasing others' thresholds for hiring him;
and (3) sunk time costs may lead voters who opposed hiring a candidate to
favour tenuring him, even after a poor probationary performance. We also
characterise the optimal voting rule when N = 2. A patient or perceptive
committee does best with a (weak) majority at the hiring stage and unanim-
ity at the tenure stage. An impatient or imperceptive committee does best
under a double (weak) majority rule. If particularly impatient or impercep-
tive, this rule implies that any hire is automatically tenured. Perversely, the
performance of a patient, imperceptive committee improves as its percep-
tiveness further declines.
Key words: intertemporal strategic voting, real options, social choice,
heterogenous priors, tenure
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Many decisions involve more than one stage of decision making. When a
committee is responsible for making such decisions, it is natural to ask what
voting rules it should follow. This paper does so in a real options setting: the
¯rst decision purchases the right to make a later, ¯nal decision. Rejection at
either stage presents the committee with a new option to consider. As the
committee will then re-apply its voting rule, the value of the outside option is
endogenous. When committees are comprised of two members, we determine
the voting rule that maximises the value of this option.
For expositional purposes, the real option that we consider is drawn
from labour economics: the right to o®er an employee a permanent posi-
tion. Tenure in academia and `up or out' rules in law, accountancy and the
military are all examples of employment decisions that fall within the scope
of our analysis (Meyer, 1992).1
Within ¯nance or corporate governance, portfolios of both real and ¯-
nancial options may be managed by teams. In political economics, bills in
parliamentary democracies must survive votes after their second and third
readings before being enacted into law; bicameral systems often require that
bills be passed by both houses in sequence; international treaties tend to be
signed by States and then rati¯ed. In law and economics, judicial decisions
motivated Condorcet's interest in committee decisions. The possibility of ap-
peal and penalty phases introduces a second decision making stage in both
cases.2 In the economics of the family, a period of engagement often precedes
marriage which, if unsuccessful, typically ends candidacy.
While all of these situations di®er in details, we believe that our model
captures the central feature of all of them, namely the management of an
option by committee.
A shortlist consisting of a single candidate is considered for probationary
hiring by a committee. Its members form priors over the likelihood that the
1McPherson and Schapiro (1999) provides a recent introduction to the tenure literature,
which includes Chatterjee and Marshall (2001); Chen and Ferris (1999); Ehrenberg, Pieper,
and Willis (1998); Carmichael (1988) and Ito and Kahn (1986). Another academic example
is the practice of refereeing articles, which are often accepted for publication only after
surviving an initial round of refereeing.
2The most notorious penalty phase decision dates to Socrates' trial. Athenian juries
¯rst voted on the defendant's innocence or guilt; a guilty ¯nding then led to a second jury
vote over the proposed penalties. Thus, Socrates was found guilty by 280 jurists, but 360
voted for his execution.
1candidate will be a good hire; these priors become common knowledge. Thus,
in contrast to much of the committee literature, our committee's problem is
one of social choice, not information aggregation. We are agnostic as to
whether the agents have private values or merely di®erent perceptions of the
common good.3 We also take no position on the information used in forming
these priors: committee members may or may not have access to private
information; they may or may not engage in deliberation.4
Having formed priors, committee members vote either in favour of or
against hiring the candidate.5 If hired, the candidate emits a publicly ob-
served performance signal. All members use this signal to update their beliefs
about the candidate. They then vote either in favour of or against granting
the candidate tenure.
As the signal is commonly known, committee members at the hiring stage
know that their relative assessments of a candidate will remain unchanged
if the candidate survives to the tenure stage. If the candidate is rejected
at either the hiring or tenure stages, the committee returns to the pool of
candidates to begin the process anew. Once back in the pool, each committee
member expects to receive V , the value of the expected game.
Framing the committee's problem recursively is the main technical con-
tribution of this paper: the value of the outside option, V , is determined
endogenously, as a function of the voting rule. This structure embeds a ¯xed
point problem in the analysis: the value of the tenure process depends on
committee members' voting strategies. Those voting strategies, in turn, de-
pend on the value that committee members ascribe to rejecting a candidate
and returning to the market.
We ¯rst analyse agents' optimal voting strategies for general committees
of size N taking V as given. Then, to solve the ¯xed point problem and
assess optimal voting rules, we specialise to the cases of N = 1 (to develop
intuitions) and N = 2. Technically, each additional committee member adds
a dimension of integration to the problem. While our methods apply to larger
N, we as yet can only apply them on a case-by-case basis rather than for
general N.
3On perceived common interests, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997, fn. 3) discuss
`competence' preferences.
4See Gerardi and Yariv (2003); Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2002) and Li, Rosen, and
Suen (2001) on debate, deliberation and strategic reporting of one's signals.
5See Ghosal and Lockwood (2003) and the references therein for an analysis of absten-
tion.
2We conduct our initial analysis in the context of a general committee
of N members, instead of specialising to N = 2, for three reasons. First,
they provide results for two stage committee problems when the value of the
outside option, V , is exogenous - novel and interesting in their own right.
Second, the generality facilitates extensions of the optimality analysis to
larger committees. Finally, there are almost no costs of this extra generality.
For general committees, we ¯nd rich intertemporal patterns of strategic
voting. Some of these are speci¯cally intrapersonal. For example, sunk
time costs can create situations in which a committee member who opposes
hiring a candidate goes on to support tenure in spite of a bad probationary
performance.
More of the patterns, however, are interpersonal. Once a voting rule is
¯xed, a tenure `weather-vane' voter - the member who always votes with
the winning side in the tenure vote - may be identi¯ed. Other committee
members then condition their votes at the hiring stage on two factors: their
own priors about a candidate, and the tenure weather-vane's, the former
in°uencing the payo®s assigned to particular outcomes, the latter in°uencing
the probability of those outcomes.
As an immediate consequence, committee members vote against hiring a
candidate that they personally favour if the tenure weather-vane is su±ciently
opposed to ensure his defeat at the tenure stage. At the other extreme, a
su±ciently enthusiastic assessment by a tenure weather-vane under some
conditions will cause other committee members to apply a higher standard
to the initial hiring of a candidate. We term this e®ect `inverse enthusiasm'.
Otherwise, enthusiasm by the tenure weather-vane lowers other committee
members' thresholds. Insight into the conditions governing these opposing
e®ects is gained by explicit appeal to an options interpretation.
Analogously to the tenure weather-vane, a probationary weather-vane
may also be identi¯ed. Thus, a su±cient statistic for a candidate's fate is
the priors of these two committee members. Increases in the mean priors
about a candidate may harm him; increases in the variance of those priors
may help him.
Finally, optimal voting rules for two person committees are derived.
If the committee is either patient or perceptive, the optimal decision rule
is a (weak) majority requirement at the hiring stage, rising to unanimity at
the tenure stage. We refer to this as a `rising threshold' rule. This seems
consistent with the practice in many departments: whatever the formal rule,
one wants to go to the dean with unanimity. It is also intuitively appealing:
3the committee hires readily as this entails either little cost or gains good
information on the candidate. The decision to grant tenure, though, is taken
more seriously.
Peculiarly, the performance of patient but imperceptive committees im-
proves - albeit only slightly - as the committee becomes less perceptive. This
owes to the tendency of the more optimistic committee member to `take a
chance' on a candidate under the rising threshold rule. As the informativeness
of the probationary signal declines, the optimist loses the ability to believe
that the pessimist will be swayed by a good probationary performance. This
leads the optimist to take fewer such chances.
The rising threshold result has the °avour of that in Meyer (1991, Section
7), in which it may be optimal to bias against the winner of an earlier con-
test. Here, discounting and aggregation via the committee work in opposite
directions: an individual committee member lowers her standards, perhaps
approving of a candidate once the time costs are sunk and he has become
eligible; the committee, as a whole, however, has a higher standard for the
second vote.
If, instead, the committee is both impatient and imperceptive, requiring
a single vote to pass at each stage is the optimal decision rule. This rule, less
demanding than the rising threshold, helps the committee by tenuring can-
didates more rapidly than does the rising threshold. When the committee is
particularly impatient or imperceptive, this rule never yields genuine proba-
tionary periods: if hired, a candidate is certainly granted tenure, removing
a further impediment to rapidly tenuring a candidate. In these cases, the
committee's problem is endogenously reduced to a one stage problem.
Two voting rules - double unanimity and falling thresholds (unanimity
followed by weak majority) - are dominated for all parameter values. As
committee members do not pool their information, the former is dominated
for reasons other than those developed in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998).
Their jurists, who have no private interests, may convict more innocent defen-
dants when required to reach unanimity than under majority votes: a pivotal
jurist who initially believes in a defendant's innocence will allow guilty votes
from the remaining jurists to overrule her private signal. Under weaker rules,
the jurist does not have this incentive to vote against her private signal.
For reviews of the literature on jury decisions and information aggrega-
tion, we recommend Persico (2004) and Ghosal and Lockwood (2003). The
social choice literature is also large. Much of its concern with decision rules
has, however, been positively motivated. Caplin and Nalebu® (1988), for
4example, show that the Condorcet paradox can always be overcome with a
super-majority rule of 64% when individual preferences and their distribu-
tion are appropriately restricted. We avoid problems of cycles by restricting
committee members' choice sets to two elements, allowing us to concentrate
on normative questions.
To our knowledge, ours is the ¯rst recursive analysis of a committee deci-
sion problem. We are also unaware of analyses of two stage committee deci-
sions.6 The question of sequential voting, in which each agent votes once, but
chooses its timing, has been addressed by Dekel and Piccione (2000). Mor-
ton and Williams (1999) investigate this in the context of US presidential
primary campaigns, presenting laboratory evidence. Polborn (2000) analy-
ses an environment in which voters decide on tax reform voting rules when
young (and poor); after a stochastic shock, when they are older (and wealth-
ier), they vote on tax reform. He shows that median voters will support
supermajority rules.
Section 2 presents the model more formally. Section 3 then analyses the
committee members' decisions during their two decision stages, taking the
voting rule and V as given. Section 4 solves the ¯xed point problem for V
when N = 1; Section 5 addresses N = 2. Section 6 concludes and compares
our model to a standard options model.
2 The model
Consider a pool of ex ante identical candidates.7 In the game's prehistory,
one of them is placed on a shortlist and evaluated by a committee of N
risk neutral members, indexed by i. For expositional clarity, assume the
committee members to be female and the candidate male.
Shortlisting the candidate gives each committee member information about
that candidates type, in her subjective opinion: a ¿ = 1 candidate is one that
she thinks will be good for the department; a ¿ = 0 candidate is one that
she thinks will be bad for the department. The subjective probability that
she assigns to the shortlisted candidate being of type ¿ = 1 is p0i » [0;1].
Without loss of generality, let p01 ¸ ¢¢¢ ¸ p0N. Generically, these can be
written as strict inequalities; we assume this in what follows.
6See Maug and Y³lmaz (2002) for a recent article on two-class voting rules.
7This model di®ers from those that allow an agent to specify the order in which can-
didates are tested; q.v. Weitzman (1979).
5We are agnostic at this point as to the distribution from which these
signals are drawn and their independence. They may re°ect deliberation, but
that is unmodelled. We merely require that the expectations are common
knowledge and that they be allowed to di®er.
At time 0, the committee members vote on hiring. Voting is costless
and mandatory: abstentions are not allowed. If strictly more than ±0N of
committee members approve, the candidate is given probation.
If the hiring vote is successful, a public signal, µ 2 f0;1g, is then received
by all committee members over the probationary period. It is common knowl-
edge that all committee members view the signal as accurately re°ecting the
candidate's type with probability ¾: P (µ = 1j¿ = 1) = P (µ = 0j¿ = 0) = ¾.





: otherwise, the signal's complement
could be used as the informative signal. Thus, the probability of a Type I
error is 1 ¡ ¾, the same as that of a Type II error.
Thus,
E0i (µ) = ¾p0i + (1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ p0i); (1)
where E0i are member i's expectations at time 0.




¶(µ)p0i + [1 ¡ ¶(µ)](1 ¡ p0i)
; (2)
where
¶(µ) ´ ¾µ + (1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ µ) 2 [0;1]:
Thus ¶(µ) = P (µj¿ = 1).
A committee member's posterior belief that a candidate is of type ¿ = 1





[¶(µ)p0i + [1 ¡ ¶(µ)](1 ¡ p0i)]
2 > 0: (3)
Thus, pT1 ¸ ¢¢¢ ¸ pTN.
At time T > 1, a tenure vote is taken. If strictly more than ±TN com-
mittee members approve, the candidate is tenured.8 As this date cannot be
brought forward, the real option is European rather than American.
8We develop the exposition for the fully general T > 1. However, the structure of the
model is such that no advantages accrue to T > 2: no further information is gained about
the candidate. Thus, the ¯xed point problem is addressed by setting T = 2.
6If, at either decision stage, the candidate fails to obtain the necessary
votes, he is dismissed and the department returns to the pool of candidates.9
In contemplating the consequences of doing so, committee members imagine
that their new priors will be independently drawn from the uniform distrib-
ution over the unit interval.
To summarise:






hire, gain public signal µ 2 f0;1g
Figure 1: The game tree and its subjective expected payo®s
This pattern of play is summarised in Figure 1. Payo®s are associated
with terminal nodes only: in options parlance, no dividends are paid. Payo®s
are discounted to time 0. Thus:
9It is therefore assumed that the department cannot hire directly at the tenured level.
Established and recognised lawyers are occasionally hired directly as lateral partners. Some
departments, such as Yale's Comparative Literature department, only hire at the tenure
level directly.
71. if a candidate is not hired, the department returns to the pool the
following year. The value of restarting the hiring process is ¯V , where
¯ 2 [0;1] is the discount factor.
2. if a probationary candidate is denied tenure, the department immedi-
ately returns to the pool. It neither su®ers costs nor gains bene¯ts
from having granted probation to a candidate.
3. ¯nally, if a candidate is granted tenure, committee member i antici-
pates an expected payo® of ¯TpTi: the actual payo® is equal to the
candidate's type.
That the probationary period does not impose costs or deliver bene¯ts
in its own right may be interpreted as the probate's teaching load ¯nancing
the probationary period. Granting tenure to a ¿ = 0 candidate may be
similarly interpreted. (As tenure does not convey salary guarantees, this
may be thought of as adjusting a tenured, non-research productive faculty
member's salary.) This structure may ¯t the legislative process more closely:
a bill does not impose costs or bene¯ts until it is enacted, but information
about these is gained during its consideration.
Under some parameter values, the game tree in Figure 1 degenerates:
some terminal nodes are dominated for committee members holding any pri-
ors. For example, were it possible that ¾ = 1
2, refusing tenure to a candidate
granted probation would always be dominated by not hiring the candidate.
Similarly, T = 1 would leave tenure refusal dominated by initial rejection.
Finally, if ¯ = 1, all candidates are hired: hiring allows no worse a payo®
to be obtained than that possible by returning to the pool; a positive sig-
nal, however, convinces any committee member that the candidate is worth
tenuring. In what follows, only generic cases are considered, unless otherwise
speci¯ed.
Lemma 1. When ¯ < 1, V (¢) 2 [0;1).
Proof. Each committee member views the most successful hiring process as
one that shortlists a p0i = 1 candidate immediately, granting him tenure
when he becomes eligible. Value, V , is bounded away from one as ¯T < 1:
discounting exacts some cost. As no payo®s accrue until a terminal node is
reached, the least successful hiring process grants a p0i = 0 candidate tenure
at some point; this earns an outcome of zero.
8The lemma's inequality on ¯ eliminates the case in which a perfectly
patient committee never grants a candidate tenure. This would produce the
indeterminate V = V .
The value, V is a function of model parameters ±0;±T;¯;N;¾ and T.
At this point, its parameters will be treated as ¯xed, and thus its value
as constant. Fixed point arguments will later be used to compute V as a
function of its parameters.
Now de¯ne strategies:
De¯nition 2. A strategy for committee member i is a pair of functions
v0i : [0;1]
N ! f0;1g and vTi : [0;1]
N ! f0;1g.
Action 1 corresponds to a `yes' vote, and action 0 to a `no'. Assume that
weakly dominated strategies are not played.10 At time T, either vTi = 0 or
vTi = 1 is weakly dominated: when i is pivotal, she loses by voting against
her beliefs; otherwise, her vote does not alter the outcome. This has three
consequences. First, it reduces the relevant domain of vTi to the support of
pTi;[0;1]: committee members do not vote strategically at time T. Second,
as dominated strategies cannot be present in the support of mixed strategies,
the assumption allows concentration on pure strategies at time T. Finally,
it ensures a unique equilibrium in the time T stage game (see Theorem 1),
simplifying time 0 analysis. It will be seen later that this e®ectively makes
the domain of v0i two dimensional.
Therefore, the expected utility of member i, as assessed at time T and
discounted to time 0, is:








Her expected utility at time 0 is
u0i (vT (pT);v0 (p0)) ´
½
uTi (vT (pT (µ;p0))) if
PN




De¯nition 3. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is:




i=1, a strategy pro¯le; and
10This assumption imposes fewer informational requirements on agents, not requiring
that they know each others' valuations. In this context, this is not a particular advantage
as we have already assumed that priors are common knowledge.
9² pT (p0;µ), a pro¯le of posterior beliefs;
such that
² v¤





















j=1 v0j (p0) > ±0N
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² pTi (p0i;µ) is de¯ned by equation 2;
8i = 1;:::;N.
3 The meetings
3.1 The tenure committee meeting










Proof. When committee member i is pivotal, she chooses the terminal payo®
that she judges higher. When she is not, her choice is without consequence.
Voting against her preferred terminal payo® is weakly dominated.
Therefore:
De¯nition 4. Member k is a weather-vane voter at time T for beliefs pT
and voting rule ±T when
k =
½
d±TNe if ±TN is not an integer;
d±TNe + 1 otherwise; (4)
where d¢e is the least integer function.
10Generically, the weather-vane is unique.
A weather-vane voter is therefore an ±T-percentile voter, a generalised
median voter. If ±TN is not an integer, then d±TNe > ±TN and there are
enough votes for passage. If ±TN is an integer, then d±TNe = ±TN and,
since we use strict inequality, this is not enough for passage; ±TN +1 will be
enough.
Thus, the committee's decision coincides with the weather-vane's vote.
A weather-vane di®ers from a dictator in that the aggregation rule does not
privilege her ex ante or independently of the beliefs of others. To see how a
weather-vane and a pivotal voter di®er, consider:
Example 1. Suppose that N = 5;±T = 1
2. Therefore, k = 3. Suppose further
that the priors are such that even committee member 5, the most skeptical,
is willing to vote for tenure. In this case, k is not pivotal: withholding her
vote would leave a majority in place. Now suppose, instead, that the priors
are such that members 4 and 5 will vote against tenure. In this case, the
remaining members are all pivotal.
In what follows, the weather-vane voter at time T is denoted by k.
3.2 The hiring committee meeting
Now consider behaviour at the initial meeting, that of the hiring committee.
Analogously to the tenure committee meeting, each committee member com-
pares her beliefs to threshold levels, functions of V . We derive and present
the four relevant threshold levels. The ¯rst two divide the tenure weather-
vane's priors into three regions: one in which she is already convinced that
the candidate should not be tenured, even if he performs well during pro-
bation; one in which she is convinced that he should be tenured, even if
he performs badly; and an intermediate region in which she will allow his
probationary performance to determine her vote. In this latter two regions,
thresholds are then established for the generic committee member's priors,








(1 ¡ ¾)V + ¾ (1 ¡ V )
: (6)
11Thus, ¹ p (resp. p) leaves committee member i indi®erent between re-
turning to the candidate pool next year and granting the existing candidate
tenure if he produces a bad (resp. good) performance signal. If p0i ¸ ¹ p (resp.
p0i · p) then committee member i will vote for (resp. against) tenure even
when the candidate emits the bad (resp. good) signal during probation:
Lemma 2.
p0i · p , pTi (1;p0i) · V ;
p0i ¸ ¹ p , pTi (0;p0i) ¸ V:





= pTk (0; ¹ p) = V: (7)
The result follows from the monotonicity of pTi in p0i, shown in equation
3.
As we would expect, a committee member must have a higher prior if she
is to support tenure for a candidate who has performed badly than she must
have for one who has performed well:
Lemma 3. 1 > ¹ p > p.
Proof. By equation 3, pTi is strictly increasing in p0i. Thus, pTi (1;p0i) and
pTi (0;p0i) have well de¯ned inverse functions; denote them by h1 and h0
respectively. Thus, by equation 7,
(V ) ´ p;h0 (V ) ´ ¹ p:





[¶p0i + (1 ¡ ¶)(1 ¡ p0)]
2;




) pTi (1;p0i) > pTi (0;p0i)8p0i 2 (0;1):
Thus, if pTi (1;p) = pTi (0;q), then q > p. Hence, h0 (V ) > h1 (V ).
To complete the proof, note that pTi (0;¢) maps the interval [0;1] to itself.
As this must also then hold true for its inverse function, h0, ¹ p = h0 (V ) ·
1.
12Corollary 1. Given weather-vane k,
1. p0k ¸ ¹ p , E0i (v¤
Tk) = 1;
2. p0k < p , E0i (v¤






Tk) = ¾p0i + (1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ p0i).
Proof. The ¯rst two cases follow directly from Lemmata 2 and 3. When p0k
is in the range speci¯ed, the third is agent k's expectation that µ = 1 will be
observed. By Theorem 1, this is equivalent to vTk = 1.
The ability to predict k's behaviour allows committee members also to
predict whether, when hiring a candidate, he is facing a true probationary
period or not:




then the candidate is
a probationary hire.
De¯nition 6. If a candidate is hired and p0k ¸ ¹ p then the candidate is a
permanent hire.
For reasons that will later be apparent, we ignore the possibility that the
candidate will be hired when p0k < p.
Now de¯ne
~ p = ¯
1¡TV ;
the initial belief that leaves i indi®erent between returning to the pool and
hiring the candidate when she knows that the weather-vane will support
the candidate's tenure (p0k ¸ ¹ p) regardless of his performance. Thus, ~ p is




TpTi (µ; ~ p)
¢
= ¯V:
As the committee members are rational and p0 is common knowledge, E0i (¢) =
E0 (¢)8i 2 N.





that the weather-vane only votes for tenure if µ = 1:
f (p0) ´ P (µ = 1)¯
TpT (1;p0) + P (µ = 0)¯
TV
= f[¾p0 + (1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ p0)]pT (1;p0) + [(1 ¡ ¾)p0 + ¾ (1 ¡ p0)]V g¯
T






;f (p0) does not have the meaning indicated above.
13Lemma 4. The function f (p0) is strictly increasing over (0;1).
Proof.
f
0 = [¾ + (1 ¡ 2¾)V ]¯
T;
so that f0 > 0 , V < ¾
2¾¡1. Consider the function x
2x¡1: at x = 1
2, it is
in¯nite; at x = 1, it equals 1; its derivative is ¡1
(2x¡1)2. As ¾
2¾¡1 monotonically





to 1 ¸ V , the result follows.
Let ^ p be the initial belief that leaves i indi®erent between returning to
the pool and probationarily hiring the candidate. As the performance signal
is now used, we expect ^ p to be a function of its accuracy:







(1 ¡ ¾)V + ¾ (1 ¡ V )
:
Proof. The value of ^ p is found by solving f (^ p) = ¯V .





longer have the indi®erence interpretation. The analysis of x
2x¡1 in the proof
of Lemma 4 shows that ^ p is ¯nite.
We expect ^ p ¸ p as there would otherwise be a range of priors in which
members were willing to hire even if the candidate stands no chance of ob-
taining tenure:
Lemma 6. ^ p ¸ p.




= ¯TV · ¯V = f (^ p). By Lemma 4,
this establishes the result.
The inequality reduces to an equality as ¯ ! 1.
These results allow us to express the optimal behaviour of voter i as a
function of p0k. More speci¯cally, voter i sets a threshold for each level of
conviction held by the tenure weather-vane. Figure 2 outlines the results:
I Member i knows that, if hired, the candidate will fail tenure. As this
delays the department's ability to return to the pool, she opposes hiring.
When p0i > ¹ p, she votes against a candidate, even though he has already



























Figure 2: Voter i's optimal behaviour at time 0 given weather-vane k at time
T when V < L
II Member i knows that, if hired, the candidate will gain tenure, regardless
of his performance. Since she is su±ciently skeptical about the candi-
date, she opposes the hire. When p0i 2 (^ p; ~ p) she votes against the can-
didate even though she would vote for him were the tenure weather-vane
less enthusiastic. We term this e®ect, indicated by the arrow, `inverse
enthusiasm'.
III Again, member i knows that the candidate will gain tenure if hired.
Now, however, she is su±ciently con¯dent in the candidate to take the
chance of hiring him.
IV Member i is skeptical of the candidate. She therefore votes against
hiring the candidate, rather than allowing k the opportunity to resolve
her uncertainty.
15V Member i votes in favour of the candidate as she is willing to allow the
weather-vane to resolve her uncertainty.
As yet, we have not determined the relative sizes of ~ p; ^ p and ¹ p. These
depend, in part, on the following object:
L(¯;¾;T) ´
¾¯T¡1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¾)
(2¾ ¡ 1)
:
We defer a proper discussion of the interpretation of L until Section 6,
con¯ning ourselves to noting now that:







T¡1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¾) · 2¾ ¡ 1:
The result then follows from 2¾ > 1.
We now present two lemmata. The ¯rst provides a condition that deter-
mines whether i's threshold for hiring is higher or lower when weather-vane
k will grant tenure regardless of performance. The second shows that this
same condition governs whether i or k applies a higher standard when k will
grant tenure regardless of performance.
Lemma 8. ^ p · ~ p , V · L(¯;¾;T).
Proof. By de¯nition of ^ p and ~ p, the lemma's ¯rst inequality may be expressed
as
¯1¡T ¡ ¾
¾ + (1 ¡ 2¾)V
V · ¯
1¡TV:






be manipulated for the result.
Similarly, then:
Lemma 9. ¹ p ¸ ~ p , V · L(¯;¾;T).
16Thus,
V · L(¯;¾;T) , ^ p · ~ p · ¹ p: (9)
The sign of this inequality in V and L will be seen to divide the committee's
parameter space into two regions.
Lemma 8 examines how the standard that committee member i applies
depends on her perception of the weather-vane's support for a candidate.
When V · L, an enthusiastic tenure weather-vane (p0k ¸ ¹ p) discourages
committee members from hiring a candidate (~ p ¸ ^ p). When V ¸ L, the
opposite holds: an enthusiastic tenure weather-vane (p0k ¸ ¹ p) now encour-
ages committee members to hire a candidate (~ p · ^ p). The ¯rst, inverse
enthusiasm, has already been introduced. Analogously, we term the second
`pro-enthusiasm'.
To understand these e®ects, think of L(¯;¾;T) as akin to the strike price
of the option and V as related to the return to buying the market. This
interpretation is more fully developed in Section 6.
Thus, when the strike price is high relative to the return to the market
(V · L), i requires a higher standard to favour hiring if she knows that k
will grant tenure (p0k ¸ ¹ p): hiring exercises the option at the relatively high
price. If, however, the weather-vane is not convinced, then hiring will only
exercise the option in the good state of nature, a proposal more appealing to
i.
On the other hand, when the return to the market is high relative to the
strike price (V ¸ L), i is more easily convinced to favour hiring if she knows
that k will grant tenure (p0k ¸ ¹ p): hiring exercises the option at the relatively
low price. If k is not convinced, i is more easily convinced to return to the
market, with its relatively high rate.
Thus, a committee member will demand a higher prior to support initial
hiring if she wants to hire on a di®erent basis (e.g. probationary or not) than
does the tenure weather-vane voter.
Now consider Lemma 9. When V · L, the prior at which k is indi®erent
between probationary and permanent hire is larger than that which leaves i
indi®erent between rejection and permanent hire. Consider this in the special
case in which i and k are the same committee member. That individual's
priors lie along the dotted diagonal line in Figure 2.
Seen this way, ¹ p ¸ ~ p divides the member's priors into three zones: those in
which she will not tenure at t = T, regardless of performance; probationary
hiring; and permanent hiring. The relatively high strike price, L, thus seems
17to attach value to retaining all three possible outcomes.
When, on the other hand, V ¸ L, the probationary hiring zone disap-
pears: the committee member opposes hiring unless she is convinced from
the outset that the candidate should be granted tenure. This case presents
an apparent paradox: the diagonal now passes through region II. In this
region, p0k 2 (¹ p; ~ p), the tenure weather-vane opposes hiring but will vote in
favour of tenure even after a bad probationary performance. Her behaviour
can be explained by the time costs that are sunk ex post, once the tenure
meeting is reached.
When inequality 9 holds, a weaker version of this reasoning applies in




implies that the tenure weather-vane votes against
hiring, although she would vote in favour of tenure if the candidate was hired
and generated µ = 1.
The lemmata above clearly give tenure weather-vanes an incentive to
dissemble, abstain or delegate their later tenure votes to others. While clearly
plausible phenomena, they are not allowed by the present model.
As every agent i compares her p0i to the same cut points, voting `yes'
when above it and `no' otherwise, a hiring weather-vane at t = 0 may be
de¯ned analogously to the tenure weather-vane at t = T:
De¯nition 7. Member j is a weather-vane voter at time 0 for beliefs p0 and
voting rule ±0 when
j =
½
d±0Ne if ±0N is not an integer;
d±0Ne + 1 otherwise; (10)
Thus, the outcome of the hiring process is a function of the beliefs of
weather-vanes j and k, as shown in Figure 3. The panel on the right refers
to the case when the inequalities in equation 9 do not hold. Refer to this two
dimensional space as weather-vane space.
In general, only half of the weather-vane space is accessible. Which half
is depends on the voting rule adopted. When, for example, j < k, the tenure
weather-vane will, by de¯nition, have at least as high a level of conviction
about a candidate as will the hiring weather-vane. In this case, the lower
triangles are accessible. When j = k, this reduces to the special case of the
diagonal line.
Candidates' success therefore depends on the beliefs of no more than two
committee members, who are determined on the basis of their ordinal beliefs
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j > k ) ±0 > ±T
V > L(¯;¾;T)
Figure 3: Outcomes given weather-vanes j and k
easily be expressed in terms of the usual moments of fp0ig. Clearly, examples
can be constructed in which higher mean priors help a candidate. We present
examples of three less obvious e®ects.
First, higher mean priors may harm a candidate through the inverse en-
thusiasm e®ect mentioned above:
Example 2. Suppose N = 5;±0 = 1;±T = 1
2 and that V < L. Then j = 5
and k = 3. Let 1 > p01 ¡5" = p02 ¡4" = p03 ¡2" = p04 ¡" = p05 > ^ p, where
" > 0, p03 2 (¹ p ¡ "; ¹ p) and p04 < ~ p. Thus, the candidate is hired unanimously
on a probationary basis. Now leave the priors unchanged other than to add "
to p03 so that p03 > ¹ p. Thus, the mean prior has increased; the variance has
remained unchanged. The tenure weather-vane's increased enthusiasm means
that hiring would be permanent. Thus, the two less convinced committee
members prevent the hire.
Next consider an example in which increased variance hurts hiring possi-
bilities:
Example 3. Suppose N = 5;±0 = 1
2;±T = 2
3 and that V < L. Then j = 3
and k = 4. Let p01 = p02 = p03 = ^ p + " < 1 and p < p04 = p05 = ^ p ¡ " < ¹ p
where " > 0. Hence the candidate is hired with an average prior of ^ p+ 1
5"; the
sample variance is 30
25"2. Now increase the most optimistic beliefs to p01 =
p02 = ^ p+2", but reduce the hiring weather-vane's to p03 = p04 = p05 = ^ p¡":
the average prior remains unchanged, the variance more than doubles, and
the candidate is not hired.
19Finally consider the opposite:
Example 4. Consider the committee and voting rule of Example 3 and let
V < L. Now let p01 = p02 = ^ p + " < 1 and p < p03 = p04 = p05 = ^ p ¡ " < ¹ p,
where again " > 0. The priors' average is now ^ p¡ 1
5"; the variance is as in the
initial case considered in Example 3, but now the candidate is not hired. Now
let the hiring weather-vane join the optimists, so that p03 = ^ p + ", but make
the pessimists gloomier, so that p04 = p05 = ^ p¡2": the sample average prior
remains the same, the variance again more than doubles, but the candidate
is hired.
Thus, the role of variance can be reduced to how it in°uences the weather-
vane: losing the hiring weather-vane loses the candidate the job; winning the
hiring weather-vane wins the job. Insofar as the priors' variance re°ects
the beliefs of all committee members, it contains richer information than is
necessary to analyse the candidate's survival.
Recasting analysis in terms of the two weather-vanes allows us to restate
our discussion of Lemmata 8 and 9 in terms of them:
Lemma 10. When V ¸ L;j ¸ k implies that there do not exists priors, p0,
that allow probationary hiring. When V ¸ L and j · k, and when V · L,
such priors exist.
This follows from inspection of Figure 3. Thus, if a voting rule that sets
the candidate a rising threshold over time (j > k) generates a high value, V ,
it does so by discarding the possibility of probationary hire. In other words,
it does so by discarding the possibility of buying options on candidates. This
suggests that V in this region should be independent of ¾. For j < k and
V > L(¯;¾;T), on the other hand, the value function should depend on ¾.
These observations are con¯rmed in our explicit computations with of N = 1
and N = 2, below. The phenomenon whereby a committee chooses not to
use informative signals is further explored in our discussion of optimal voting
rules (Section 5.5).
The initial discussion of degeneracy was based on the extensive form rep-
resentation in Figure 1. Viewing Figures 2 and 3 as strategic form represen-
tations allows this discussion to be revisited. All of the conclusions presented
initially can now be stated in terms of threshold beliefs, V and L.
Setting ¾ = 1
2 implies p = ¹ p = V > L = ¡1. Thus, the possibility of
probationary hiring disappears. Setting T = 1 sets ^ p and ~ p to in¯nity as
well and L < 0. Thus, the committee always rejects candidates.
20Finally, when ¯ = 1 so does L, so that L > V . Thus, probationary hiring
is retained. As ¾ ! 1;p ! 0; ¹ p ! 1 and ^ p ! 0. In the limit, all candidates
are probationarily hired.
Up to this point, V has been treated as a positive parameter. In fact, V
depends on the committee's voting behaviour. This presents a ¯xed point
problem: the cut points ^ p; ~ p;p and ¹ p depend on V which, in turn, depends
on the cut points. The next two sections address this problem. To build
intuition, we ¯rst address this problem in the context of a single committee
member.
4 A single committee member: N = 1
When N = 1, a generic expression for V may be constructed from the diag-
onal in Figure 3. Depending on the inequalities in equation 9, this contains
either two or three relevant intervals. We consider the simpler case ¯rst.
When the inequalities in equation 9 do not hold, V is bounded below.
Thus, as displayed in the right panel of Figure 3, there are only two relevant
intervals. In the ¯rst, the candidate is not hired; in the second, he is hired
on a permanent basis. Probationary hire is excluded.
We assume, for tractability's sake, that the committee member imagines
her priors over the as yet unknown next candidate, p0 2 [0;1], to be drawn

















One of these solutions may be eliminated by the following lemma, which
applies more generally to N > 1:
Lemma 11. When ¯ < 1; ~ p > 1 ) V = 0.
Proof. By Lemma 3, ~ p > 1 ) ~ p > ¹ p. This, by inequalities 9, in turn implies
that ^ p ¸ ~ p > 1. Thus, the committee never hires a candidate. As it is
impatient, it therefore expects no return.
Corollary 2. V > ¯T¡1 is inadmissible.
Proof. V > ¯T¡1 ) ~ p > 1. By Lemma 11, this implies V = 0 < ¯T¡1, a
contradiction.
21The lemma thus eliminates the larger solution to equation 11, which sets







¸ 1. Thus, only the smaller one is admissible.
As predicted by Lemma 10, the solution is a function of ¯ and T alone:
when probationary hire is discarded, so is the value function's dependence
on ¾.
Now consider the case in which the inequalities in expression 9 hold,
bounding V above. This involves three relevant intervals. First, over p0 2
[0; ^ p), the candidate is not hired. The di®erence between p and ^ p re°ects
that between ex ante and ex post calculations: having reached the tenure
meeting, the member's impatience about the costs associated with probation
are irrelevant; at the hiring meeting, she requires a higher level of con¯dence
in a candidate.
Second, over p0 2 [^ p; ¹ p), the candidate is hired probationarily. Finally,
when p0 2 [¹ p;1], the candidate is permanently hired. Thus,
V = ^ p¯V +
Z ¹ p
^ p







This expression yields an unwieldy polynomial in V , hindering analytical
progress. Thus, projections of V onto the (¯;¾) plane are derived computa-
tionally for T = 2.11 We focus on the T = 2 case from now on.12
The results are combined with those from equation 11 and displayed in
Figure 4. The rightmost contour corresponds to V = 9
10.
The curve bisecting the panels represents the intersection of the V and L
surfaces. Above it, V < L, producing equation 12; below it, V > L, produc-
ing equation 11 - the region without probationary hire. As ¯ and ¾ increase,
the costs of probationary hire decrease: mistakes are less costly, probationary
periods more informative. Thus, the region in which the committee discards
probationary hire shrinks.
The other statics are also appealing. Value strictly increases in ¯. It
increases strictly in ¾ when equation 12 holds, but is otherwise insensitive
to ¾, as noted above. This may be restated to note that higher values are
attainable when V < L than when V > L: there is value in being able to
11The Maple code used is available at www.economics.bham.ac.uk/rowat/research/ARZ-
maple.zip. Corollary 2 is used to eliminate solutions setting V > ¯ in this and the N = 2
cases.
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when N = 1
use an informative signal. In larger committees, we shall see that this is not
always so.
5 Committees of two: N = 2
Now consider N = 2. This is the simplest example in which voting rules
may be compared. The value of the game now generally depends on both
committee members' priors, (p01;p02). This implies two dimensional integra-
tion. We therefore generalise the assumption in the previous section so that
p0 » UID[0;1]
2. As committee members 1 and 2 can only be identi¯ed as
such once their priors have been realised, refer to them as a and b ex ante.
This generates four separate cases to consider, corresponding to the pos-
sible combinations of weather-vanes, (j;k). Without loss of generality, as
23committee members are identical before their priors are realised, we concen-
trate on the payo®s expected by b. To indicate that value varies by voting
rule, let Vjk be the value function under weather-vanes j and k.
5.1 Double (weak) majority: (j;k) = (1;1)
The case of N = 2 and (j;k) = (1;1) is that of (weak) majority rule at both
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V11 > L(¯;¾;T)
Figure 5: Payo®s expected by member b when N = 2;(j;k) = (1;1)
Again, ¯rst consider the case of V11 ¸ L(¯;¾;T). The payo®s expected
by committee member b are displayed in the right panel of Figure 5. Below
its diagonal, a is the more optimistic member, so that p01 = p0a; above the
diagonal, the roles are reversed and p01 = p0b.
In the lower inner triangle, weather-vane a rejects the candidate, so that b
expects a payo® of ¯V11. In the lower quadrilateral, weather-vane a hires and
tenures the candidate; the payo® expected by b now depends on her prior.
The situation is symmetric in the upper triangle. In this case, while b still
expects a payo® of ¯Tp0b if the candidate is tenured, this is higher than it
would be were a the weather-vane.
24Formally,




















1 ¡ ~ p
3¢
¸ L(¯;¾;T):
Consistent with Lemma 10, this is again independent of ¾.
Now consider the case of V11 · L(¯;¾;T). The payo®s expected by
committee member b are displayed in the left panel of Figure 5. The inter-
pretation is the same as previously: the lower square corresponds to beliefs in
which the candidate is rejected; the band above it corresponds to those beliefs
in which the candidate is hired probationarily; the upmost band corresponds
to those beliefs in which the candidate is hired permanently.
Our formal expression of this is written slightly counter-intuitively, but
simpli¯es the terms in the limits of integration:
































[(1 ¡ 2¾)V11 + ¾]
¡
¹ p
3 ¡ ^ p
3¢
+ 1 ¡ ¹ p
3ª
· L(¯;¾;T):
Qualitatively, the results are similar to those in Figure 4.
5.2 Double unanimity: (j;k) = (2;2)
The expected payo®s when j = k = 2 and V22 > L(¯;¾;T) are depicted
in Figure 6. Its space is divided into the same regions as those in Figure 5,
and by the same cut point, ~ p. The di®erence between the two is that the
boundaries in Figure 5 are demarcated by the beliefs of the more optimistic
agent; the present ones are demarcated by the less optimistic agent. Thus,
V22 =
£





(1 + ~ p)(1 ¡ ~ p)
2 ¯
T ¸ L(¯;¾;T): (13)
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Figure 6: Payo®s expected by member b when N = 2;(j;k) = (2;2);V22 >
L(¯;¾;T)
When V22 < L(¯;¾;T) the map of expected payo®s resembles that in the
left panel of Figure 5, but with the boundaries demarcated by the beliefs of
the less optimistic agent. Thus:
V22 =
£





(1 + ¹ p)(1 ¡ ¹ p)
2 ¯
T + ¯




[(1 ¡ 2¾)V22 + ¾]¯
T £¡
¹ p + ¹ p




^ p + ^ p
2 ¡ ^ p
3¢¤
· L(¯;¾;T):
Again, the resulting contours are qualitatively similar to those found in
the j = k = 1 case.
5.3 Falling threshold: (j;k) = (2;1)
When (j;k) = (2;1) and V21 > L(¯;¾;T), the map of expected payo®s is
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Figure 7: Payo®s expected by member b when N = 2;(j;k) = (2;1);V12 <
L(¯;¾;T)
de¯ned as in equation 13.
When V21 < L(¯;¾;T), expected payo®s are as displayed in Figure 7;
they are symmetric about p0a = p0b. Now, the central square corresponds to
probationary hiring; the object to its upper right corresponds to permanently
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· L(¯;¾;T):
As the contours of V are qualitatively similar to those already derived,
they are not displayed.
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V21 > L(¯;¾;T)
Figure 8: Payo®s expected by member b when N = 2;(j;k) = (1;2)
When (j;k) = (1;2), expected payo®s are as depicted in Figure 8; the left
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· L(¯;¾;T):
Thus, this is the ¯rst in which the value function contains a term in ¾
when V > L.
The contours of V12 are displayed in Figure 9. The most signi¯cant feature
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when N = 2;j = 1;k =
2
the N = 1 case, and under the other voting rules, value was insensitive
to the signal quality: as predicted by Lemma 10, a failure of inequality 9
corresponded to a rejection of probationary hiring in these cases.
In contrast, not only is the signal taken into account when V12 ¸ L(¯;¾;T),
but decreased signal quality improves the value of the problem to the com-
mittee. The e®ect is very weak: that the relevant contours in Figure 9 curve
backward near ¾ = 1
2 only becomes obvious under magni¯cation. Techni-
cally, as ¾ ! 1
2;p ! ¹ p, causing probationary hiring to disappear. Intuitively,
as signal quality decreases, an optimistic hiring weather-vane ceases to hope
that a good performance by a marginal candidate will convince the skeptics
with his probationary performance.
295.5 The optimal voting rule
The optimal voting rule for N = 2 is determined by pairwise comparison of
the voting rules analysed above. Each pair of value functions is implicitly
plotted in (¯;¾;V ) space. This is implemented by a root-¯nding technique
on a (50;50;50) grid.13 Projection onto the (¯;¾) plane then allows identi¯-
cation of the function with the greater value for any (¯;¾) combination.
Comparison reveals (1;2) to at least weakly dominate (2;2) for all (¯;¾).
Similarly, (2;1) is at least weakly dominated by (1;2) for all (¯;¾). Before
discarding the dominated voting rules, we suggest intuitions for these results.
Consider ¯rst the dominance of (2;2) by (1;2). The two rules agree
at the tenure meeting: unanimity is required. The ¯rst rule is, however,
more restrictive at the hiring meeting. When a committee is perceptive, this
more restrictive rule gives it fewer opportunities to use its perception: fewer
candidates are hired. When a committee is imperceptive, its tenure decision
largely re°ects its priors; a good rule should therefore get candidates to that
decision point quickly - which (2;2) does less well than does (1;2).
As to the dominance of (2;1) by (1;2) for all (¯;¾), neither rule is more
stringent than the other in the sense of requiring the candidate to garner more
votes over the two periods. However, the dominated rule imposes its stricter
vote at the outset, when priors have not yet been informed by probationary
performance. The preferred rule allows its stricter vote to condition on this
performance.
The only remaining pairwise comparison is between (1;1) and (1;2). Fig-
ure 10 displays the result, which may be partitioned into four regions:14
I in this region, L > V12 > V11. This corresponds to the left panel in
Figure 8. Thus, it allows probationary hiring.
II in this region, V12 > V11 and V12 > L. This corresponds to the right
panel in Figure 8. Probationary hiring is again possible, and is subject
to the perverse e®ect of decreased signal quality noted above.
13Maple 9.5 code available at www.economics.bham.ac.uk/rowat/research/ARZ-
maple.zip.
14As some of the plotted values re°ect poor numerical approximation, we ignore two
features. First, the e®ects along ¯ = 0 and in the ¯ = ¾ = 1 corner. Second, the



















Figure 10: Optimal voting rules
III in this region, L > V11 > V12. This corresponds to the left panel in
Figure 5. It also allows probationary hiring.
IV ¯nally, V11 > V12 and V11 > L. This corresponds to the right panel in
Figure 5. It does not allow probationary hiring.
In regions I and II, the optimal rule is to allow the optimists to `buy the
option' on a candidate, but the skeptics to choose whether or not to exercise
it. For a patient committee, the mistake to avoid is not a delayed hire, but
a bad hire. With an informative signal, even a skeptic will be convinced by
a good performance. Signal quality deterioration into region II reduces the
use of probationary hiring.
31In regions III and IV, the double (weak) majority rule is preferred. In-
tuitively, skepticism about candidates when a committee is impatient and
imperceptive is very costly, o®ering the possibility of repeated returns to the
pool. Thus, optimists are made pivotal in both meetings, quickly hiring and
tenuring. When the committee is particularly impatient or imperceptive -
region IV - it even rejects probationary hiring, reducing its problem to a one
stage problem.
Thus, as a committee becomes more impatient or imperceptive, its op-
timal rule progressively speeds the expected time to tenure a candidate: as
patience or perceptiveness decrease, the majority requirement at tenure is
eased, and then the committee gives up the ability to engage in probationary
hiring.
Similar pairwise comparisons also show that the two optimal voting rules
for N = 2 are dominated by the N = 1 committee. This comparison is the
wrong one, however: the problem here is not one of aggregating information
about a candidate, but one of social choice. A single committee member does
not have less relevant information, but does not need to compromise.
Thus, the more appropriate comparison is between the optimal voting
rules presented above, and another one in which j = k8(¯;¾): one committee
member making the decisions, but on behalf of both. We have shown that
(j;k) = (1;1) is optimal for some values of (¯;¾), but not others.
6 Discussion
The options interpretation suggested above is outlined more explicitly by
reference to Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979) (CRR). That presented a
discrete-time model for valuing European options managed by risk neutral
unitary investors.
In CRR, the current value of an asset on which a call is written either
moves up or down to p¤ by an exogenously determined amount in the next
period. In our case, priors - expected values - are exogenous, and the extent of
their updating to posteriors determined by the variance parameter, ¾. Their
time to maturity is our T. Their valuation formula does not depend on \the
probability that the stock price will rise or fall"; our Vjk is independent of
p0 and the realisation of µ.
There are, however, two principle di®erences between our model and the
standard model, as exempli¯ed by CRR. First is the way in which it is closed.
32In CRR, the interest rate - the return to the market portfolio - is exogenous.
With K, the option's strike price, the underlying asset's prices, and a no-
arbitrage condition, this allows calculation of the cost of the call option.
In our case, V , the expected return to the `market', is endogenous. En-
dogenising this requires giving something up to avoid over-determining the
system. This explains the absence of the no-arbitrage assumption in our
model: the market for candidates is not perfectly competitive. We could free
the return to a `good' candidate, currently set at 1, if we wished to both use
a no-arbitrage condition and not over-determine the system.
The second di®erence is that our option is managed by a committee.
Thus, `rational exercise policy' gives way to a `strategic exercise policy' in
our environment. In CRR, the option's exercise depends on whether the
option is in or out of the money:
maxf0;p
¤ ¡ Kg: (14)
Versions of this appear in our more complicated environment. First, the
committee's decision to exercise the option on a probationary candidate,
granting him tenure, is governed by
maxf0;pTk ¡ Vjkg:
The condition on when to buy the option - hire a candidate - is more com-
plicated:
maxf0;p0j ¡ minf^ p; ~ pgg: (15)
Nevertheless, its interpretation is the same: when expression 15 is `in the
money', a candidate is hired. Which of the terms in the min operator is
smaller depends, in turn, on
maxf0;Vjk ¡ Lg: (16)
As a function of exogenous parameters, but not of the voting rule, L seems
to parallel K in CRR. This o®ers an interpretation of the upper bound of
unity on L: a strike price above the underlying asset's maximum price does
not make sense.
Remembering, from expression 9, that Vjk > L , ^ p > ~ p > ¹ p, we may
obtain an options interpretation from expression 16 as well. The committee's
decision when the expression is `in the money' is somewhat complicated, and
depends on the voting rule. Generally, however, it may be interpreted as
33an option on probationary hiring: hiring with the possibility of not granting
tenure.
We now discuss some of our assumptions. First, consider the heterogenous
priors assumption. Theoretically it is be a weaker one than that of common
priors Heifetz (2001); nevertheless, it is a less common one.
Feinberg (2000) demonstrates that, under the assumptions applicable
here, common priors do not exist if and only if there is a bet that risk neutral
individuals are commonly known to be willing to accept against each other.
This situation does not seem uncommon: trade does occur.
Morris (1995) posits a number of \common sense preconditions for ex-
planations involving heterogenous prior beliefs", including the presence of
limited opportunity for learning. While we have assumed that committee
members learn a great deal about each other, our environment seems consis-
tent with Morris's example:
heterogeneous prior beliefs might persist ...where individuals put
positive probability on the truth, but learning is endogenous, so
it is costly to discover the truth. Thus an employer might believe
(with high probability) that a certain class of workers is of low
ability. If the probability was su±ciently high, it would not even
be worthwhile to hire a worker in order to discover if his belief
was correct.
Now consider the assumption of Bayesian committee members. A weaker
form of updating su±ces for the results: committee members' only need
to be able to predict their future relative assessments of a candidate and
form expectations over the weather-vane's posteriors. This departure from
rationality, however, might call into question the otherwise rational play. A
second weakening is also possible: members could also receive private signals,
perhaps informing the non-commonly held elements of their values. In this
case, analysis would be similar, but committee members would be forced
to vote on the basis of `expected weather-vanes'. This complicates analysis
without clearly adding insight.
Tighter empirical tests may also be posed. Variance in ± and T across
ranked institutions would allow estimation of the share of their ranking that
can be explained by the discrepancy between institutions' voting rules and
the optimal ones.15
15Empirical testing may not be straightforward: a higher ranked institution will attract
more highly quali¯ed candidates, and possibly have more perceptive judges.
34A second empirical observation may be made. Given any voting rule, ±,
and knowledge of a committee's ¯ and ¾ parameters, we can calculate the
areas forming Figure 3. This, in turn, allows statements about the proba-
bilities of the possible outcomes: the likelihood that a generic candidate is
rejected; is hired but then refused tenure; and is hired, and then granted
tenure.
Conversely, knowing these probabilities and the voting rule, may allow
inference about the committee's ¯ and ¾ parameters. The promotion rate
to tenure in law schools, for example, is substantially higher than that of
other departments in major research universities (compare Siow (1998) with
Chused (1988)). Thus, law schools engage in less probationary hiring. As-
suming that discount factors do not vary signi¯cantly by discipline, this dif-
ference could be accounted for if ¾ was lower in law schools: ¾ ! 1
2 causes
the zone of probationary hiring disappears.
Finally, we turn to possible extensions to the model. Without altering
its analytical structure at all, that of most obvious interest is to extend the
analysis of optimal rules to committees with more than two members. The
techniques applied above can be extended to N > 2 on a case-by-case basis,
but it would be preferable to have a technique that allowed assessment for a
general N.
A second, more involved extension would be to make T a meaningful
variable. At present, T = 2 is optimal for all committees: the signal that
they receive on a probationary candidate is no worse over a short probation-
ary period than it is over a long one; further, larger values of T delay the
committee's ability to return to the pool if a probationary hire emits a bad
signal. A more satisfactory treatment might address two issues.
First, longer probationary periods could allow the committee to receive
more realisations of µ; alternatively, the accuracy of ¾ could increase in T.
Second, payo®s could be allowed to accrue over the probationary period,
rather than just upon granting tenure. This approach alters the interpreta-
tion of the pi: once payo®s are actually observed, they are no longer expected
payo®s.
A third extension would be to consider a European option version of the
model, wherein the committee has the right to `exercise' at every point up to
T. Setting T to a high value would allow analysis of jobs subject to regular
review.
A fourth, deeper extension, would specify a richer environment within
which the candidate presented himself to the committee. A candidate is a
35rival good, and thus may face bids from other institutions. Additionally, our
candidates are inert, not even, for example, choosing e®ort levels. This ab-
straction may not have important analytical consequences as the signal may
represent a reduced form of the e®ort choice. Perhaps more importantly, a
candidate might seek to alter the distribution of committee members' priors.
Finally, we may consider deepening as well as extension. Two stage de-
cision processes may be seen as forms of incomplete contracts. While these
processes are observed in practice, no motives for them from, for example,
Tirole (1999), have been presented here. Indeed, as the model is structured,
they seem precluded: if agents know that they all are updating their priors on
the basis of a common signal, they could write a contract at the probationary
decision o®ering permanent employment, contingent upon satisfying perfor-
mance targets. Rent seeking by committee members might be one reason for
retaining discretion, but that is not modelled.
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